






































































































• Comparing   the   software's   ability   of   detecting   anomalous   users  with   another   type   of  AD 
software that works on the same type of trace (VoIP SEAL)
























anomalous   users   detectable  with   our   software),   comparing   the   software's   performances   in 
detecting   different   types   of   anomalies   and   analyzing   in   detail   their   dependence   from   the 
parameters' values.













detecting   actions   that   attempt   to   compromise   the   confidentiality,   integrity   or   availability   of   a 
system/network. 
Traditionally,   intrusion  detection   systems  have  been  classified  as   a   signature  detection   system,  an 








two  major   advantages   over   signature   based   intrusion   detection   systems.   The   first   advantage   that 






the   anomaly   detection   approach   has   its   share   of   drawbacks   as   well.   For   example,   the   intrinsic 





An intrusion detection system is  a software tool  used to detect unauthorized access  to a computer 
system or network. An intrusion detection system is capable of detecting all types of malicious network 
traffic  and computer  usage.  This   includes  network attacks  against  vulnerable  services,  data  driven 
attacks on 
applications,   host­based   attacks   ­such   as   privilege   escalation,   unauthorized   logins   and   access   to 






attributed to Anderson  [7].   In his report,  Anderson presents a  threat model that classifies threats as 
external penetrations, internal penetrations, and misfeasance, and uses this classification to develop a 
security  monitoring   surveillance   system   based   on   detecting   anomalies   in   user   behavior.   External 





detected   by   assuming   that   users   of   a   computer/network  would   behave   in   a  manner   that   enables 
automatic profiling. In other words, a model of the behavior of the entity being monitored could be 
constructed by an intrusion detection system, and subsequent behavior of the entity could be verified 















here that  the algorithms to detect  suspicious activities  are  implemented.  Algorithms for  the 
analysis   and   detection   of   intrusions   have   been   traditionally   classified   into   three   broad 



























for   the   system   administrator   to   determine   exactly   which   attacks   the   system   is   currently 
experiencing. If the audit data in the log files do not contain the attack signature, no alarm is 










detect   insider   attacks.   For   instance,   if   a   user   or   someone   using   a   stolen   account   starts 
performing   actions   that   are   outside   the   normal   user­profile,   an   anomaly   detection   system 
generates  an alarm.  Second,  because the system is  based on customized profiles,   it   is  very 
difficult for an attacker to know with certainty what activity it can carry out without setting off 
8
an alarm. Third,  an anomaly detection system has the ability  to detect  previously unknown 
attacks.  This   is  due   to   the   fact   that  a  profile  of   intrusive  activity   is  not  based  on specific 
signatures   representing   known   intrusive   activity.  An   intrusive   activity   generates   an   alarm 
because it deviates from normal activity, not because someone configured the system to look for 
a   specific   attack   signature.  Anomaly   detection   systems,   however,   also   suffer   from   several 
drawbacks. The first obvious drawback is that the system must go through a training period in 
which appropriate user  profiles  are created by defining “normal”  traffic  profiles.  Moreover, 
creating a normal traffic profile is a challenging task. The creation of an inappropriate normal 
traffic profile  can lead to poor performance.  Maintenance of  the profiles can also be time­
consuming.  Since,  anomaly detection systems are  looking for  anomalous events  rather   than 










• A  hybrid  or  compound   detection   system  combines   both   approaches.   In   essence,   a   hybrid 
detection system is a signature inspired intrusion detection system that makes a decision using a 
















• Not   intrusive  but   anomalous:  These  are   false  positives.   In  other  words,   the  activity   is  not 


































However,   statistical   anomaly  detection   schemes  also  have drawbacks.  Skilled  attackers  can   train  a 
statistical   anomaly   detection   to   accept   abnormal   behavior   as   normal.   It   can   also   be   difficult   to 
determine thresholds that balance the likelihood of false positives with the likelihood of false negatives. 
In  addition,  statistical  methods need accurate statistical  distributions,  but,  not all  behaviors can be 




used  both  user   and  group­based   anomaly  detection   strategies,   and  modeled   system parameters   as 





minimal   capabilities  was  created  using   restrictions  based on  the  user’s  group membership.   It  was 
designed   to  detect   six   types  of   intrusions:  attempted  break­ins  by unauthorized  users,  masquerade 
attacks,   penetration   of   the   security   control   system,   leakage,  DoS   attacks   and  malicious  use.  One 
drawback of Haystack was that it was designed to work offline. The attempt to use statistical analyses 






intrusions  could  be   flagged by detecting  departures   from established normal  behavior  patterns   for 


















distribution   is  kept   in   the  form of  a  histogram with  probabilities  associated  with  each one of   the 
possible ranges that the variable can take. The cumulative frequency distribution is then built by using 
the   ordered   set   of   bin   probabilities.   Using   this   frequency   distribution,   and   the   value   of   the 
corresponding measure for the current audit record, it is possible to compute a value that reflects how 































































given program  in  a  particular   environment,   the  database  was   then  used   to  monitor   the  program's 



























interest.  When   used   in   conjunction   with   statistical   techniques,   Bayesian   networks   have   several 



















events  as  an   intrusion  with  sufficient  confidence.  Although using  Bayesian  networks   for   intrusion 











transmitting,  visualizing and understanding  the data  is  becoming more complex and expensive.  To 
tackle the problem of high dimensional datasets, researchers have developed a dimensionality reduction 
technique  known as  Principal  Component  Analysis   (PCA)  [33­35].   In  mathematical   terms,  PCA is  a 
technique where n correlated random variables are transformed into d ≤ n uncorrelated variables. The 
uncorrelated variables are linear combinations of the original variables and can be used to express the 
data  in a reduced form. Typically,  the first principal component of  the transformation is   the linear 








detection   scheme and  was  applied   to   reduce   the  dimensionality  of   the  audit  data   and  arrive  at   a 
classifier that is a function of the principal components. They measured the Mahalanobis distance of 
each observation   from  the  center  of   the  data   for   anomaly  detection.  The Mahalanobis  distance   is 
computed based on the sum of squares of the standardized principal component scores. Shyu et al. 










obtained.  Subsequently,   the probability   that   the sequence of states  X  t  −   N   +1  ,...,  X  t  is  normal was 





being modeled is  assumed to be a  Markov process with unknown parameters.  The challenge  is   to 



















































models TCP connections.  Even though,   the data set  is  multivariate network traffic  data containing 
fields extracted out of the packet headers, the authors break down the multivariate problem into a set of 
univariate problems and sum the weighted results from range matching along each dimension. While 






The one major  drawback of  many of   the  machine   learning  techniques,   like   the  system call  based 
sequence analysis approach and the hidden Markov model approach mentioned above, is that they are 
resource expensive. For example, an anomaly detection technique that is based on the Markov chain 
model   is  computationally expensive because  it  uses parametric  estimation  techniques  based on  the 
Bayes’   algorithm   for   learning   the   normal   profile   of   the   host/network   under   consideration.   If  we 




To eliminate   the  manual  and ad­hoc elements   from  the  process  of  building  an   intrusion  detection 
system, researchers are increasingly looking at using data mining techniques for anomaly detection [45­




























classification rules from the decision tree.  Other algorithms (for eg. RIPPER  [25],  C4.5  [49])  directly 




advantages of using RIPPER is that the generated rules are easy to use and verify. Lee et al.   [45,  46,  50] 
used RIPPER to characterize sequences occurring in normal data by a smaller set of rules that capture 


















































[62]  present   the   Anomalous   Network­Traffic   Detection   with   Self   Organizing  Maps   (ANDSOM). 
ANDSOM is the anomaly detection module for the network based intrusion detection system, called 
INBOUNDS, being developed at Ohio University. The ANDSOM module creates a two dimensional 




































the  Euclidean  distance.  Since  each  feature  contributes   equally   to   the  calculation  of   the  Euclidean 
distance, this distance is undesirable in many applications. This is especially true when features have 
very different variability or different features are measured on different scales. The effect of the features 
that have large scales of measurement or high variability  would dominate others  that  have smaller 
scales or less variability. A distance­based approach which incorporates this measure of variability is 
the  Mahalanobis   distance  [74,   75]  based   outlier   detection   scheme.   In   this   scheme,   the   threshold   is 
computed according to the most distant points from the mean of the “normal” data, and it is set to be a  
user defined percentage, say m% , of the total number of points. In this scheme, all data points in the  




























together.  The   concept   of   association   rules   can   be  understood   as   follows:  Given   a   database  D  of 
transactions where each transaction T  D denotes a set of items in the database, an association rule is∈  
an implication of the form X => Y , where X   D , Y   D and X   Y =   . The rule X => Y holds in⊂ ⊂ ∩ ∅  
the transaction set D with confidence c if c% of transactions in X also contain Y . Two important  
concepts when dealing with association rules are rule confidence and rule support. The probability of 








raw data was converted  into ASCII network packet   information,  which  in   turn was converted  into 
connection­level   information.   These   connection   level   records   contained   connection   features   like 




















































Lee et al.  [45,  86]  extended the work done by them in  [50]  and proposed a hybrid detection scheme that 
utilized  the Common Intrusion Detection Framework (CIDF) to automatically get audit  data,  build 
models, and distribute signatures for novel attacks to ensure that the time required to detect them is  
reduced. The advantage of using CIDF was that it enabled different intrusion detection and response 


















































our   case  64),  because  of   the  collisions   that  happen   in   the   sketch   table.  We obtain  a   randomized 
aggregation of the traffic, different for each hash­function used: each IP flow (URI for VoIP traffic) 






















































describe   the  normal   behavior   only  using   these  ones.   It   is  worth  highlighting   that   the  number  of 
dominant PCs is a very important parameter, and needs to be properly tuned when using PCA as a 










This   step   is   performed  by   separating   the   high­dimensional   space   of   traffic  measurements   in   two 




















After   detecting   the   anomalous   time­bins   the   system   tries   to   perform   an   identification   phase,   to 

































































































































































































































































































































































quite   low   (around   5),   so  we   decided   to   perform   the   analysis   varying   the   number   of   Principal 
Components from 1 to 10.
The   threshold  was   the   hardest   parameter   to   set,   because   the   software   performances   are   heavily 
dependent on this value, and the appropriate value for obtaining an effective detection of anomalies is 
deeply related to the type of trace used. Trying the software on an IP traffic trace and on VoIP traces of  
different   duration   (a   few  days,   one  week   and   finally   one  month,   the   trace   described   before)  we 
discovered that the appropriate threshold's values changed a lot from one trace to the other. A the end 















































































most   of   the   false   alarms   come  out  with   low  values   of   the   threshold.  This   phenomenon   is   quite 
predictable,   because   a   low   threshold's   value   lead   to   a   higher   number   of   time­bins   detected   as 
anomalous, and since the identification method tries to point out a responsible user for each anomalous 
time­bin there could be two types of errors in the execution:















We can  observe  how  these  “best”   threshold's  values  are  dependent   from  the  number  of  Principal 
Components used in the analysis on the following graphs (Figure 5 – Figure 10).
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The   number   of   Principal   Components   included   in   the  normal  subspace   influences   the  way   the 
algorithm tries to model the standard behavior of the traffic. Using a higher number of PCs leads to a  
more complex model of the normal traffic, including most of the variability in the trace, but it can lead 



































minimum to the maximum value),  we would confirm this   theory,  observing that a  low number of 






















We   can   select   an   appropriate   number   of   Principal  Components   according   to   the   type   of 

















one   anomalous   user   per   time­bin.   That   is   a   big   trouble,   compared   to   other   type   of  AD 
techniques,  because  it   imposes a   limit   to   the number of anomalous users detectable by  the 
system: we can only identify a single responsible user for each anomalous time­bin (and in a 
trace not every time­bin can be considered anomalous), so we have not only a limited number of 




In   the   following  table  we'll   try   to   resume  the   result  of   this  analysis,  writing   the   total  number  of 
anomalous  users   identified  with  a  “wide  thresholds”  analysis   (from 0.000001  to 0.0001),   for  each 
number of PCs used, and trying to classify the users identified as “top­users” (in the list of the top­200 





























1 30 18 8 4
2 36 16 16 4
3 33 14 17 2
4 31 13 16 2
5 31 13 16 2
6 29 13 16 0
7 31 14 15 2
8 32 14 16 2
9 33 15 15 3
10 30 14 16 0





































































































































the anomalous users  identified are removed from the  trace,  giving  the possibility,   in   the following 
rounds, to identify anomalous users that could remain hidden behind the ones previously identified. A 
small number of PCs is more suited for this kind of process, since it permits the detection of high 








first   rounds,   but   these   kind   of   detections   have   not   the   same   impact   on   the   traffic   modeling 
53







































scores .  Each calls  is  the classified as “Normal”,  “Suspicious” and “Anomalous”  by means of this 
















































































Score Detected Total Percentage
Over 10 9 29 31.03%
9 – 10 11 62 17.74%
8 – 9 1 81 1.23%
7 – 8 3 71 4.23%
6 – 7 2 63 3.17%
5 – 6 5 627 0.80%
Average score
Score Detected Total Percentage
Over 7 3 9 33.33%
6 – 7 9 22 40.91%
5 – 6 8 49 16.33%
4 – 5 5 76 6.58%
3 – 4 3 79 3.80%
5.6 Considerations on the results







round   analysis   with   2   Principal   Components,   for   example,   we   needed   36   rounds,   each   round 
corresponding almost to the full analysis performed in the first section (even if we don't scan the full 
range of thresholds in each round, we must compute every time the first step of the software, the matrix 
construction,   that   requires,  more  or   less,  half   the   time needed  to compute   the  second  step   for  10 
different numbers of PCs and 100 different thresholds).
The massive computational   requirements  can be reduced using some variations  of   the process,   for 


















































































































































































































































































several  graphs   (one  for   each anomaly  height)   the   range of   thresholds   in  which   that   anomaly  was 
detected versus the number of PCs used in the analysis. We can see one of this graphs in Figure 32 (the  
one with anomaly height of 1000 calls), in which the top line is the maximum threshold for which that 































































































































































































































































































High Thresh 1 PC
High Thresh 2 PC
High Thresh 3 PC
High Thresh 4 PC
High Thresh 5 PC
High Thresh 6 PC
High Thresh 7 PC
High Thresh 8 PC
High Thresh 9 PC

































































































































































































































































confirm plotting  the  number  of   times   each   anomalous 
time­bin was detected (we didn't include not­anomalous 
time­bins,  cause  they were never  been detected)  versus 
the amount of global calls in that time­bin, ordering the 
results by the number of global calls. We did in Figure 
44,   with   an   anomaly   height   of   1000   calls;   with   the 
exceptions   of   time­bins   related   with   overlapping 
anomalies (the ones with amounts of calls from 1400 to 
2000)   the   number   of   times   each   time­bin   is   detected 












































































































































































High Thresh 1 PC
High Thresh 2 PC
High Thresh 3 PC
High Thresh 4 PC
High Thresh 5 PC
High Thresh 6 PC
High Thresh 7 PC
High Thresh 8 PC
High Thresh 9 PC


















High Thresh 1 PC
High Thresh 2 PC
High Thresh 3 PC
High Thresh 4 PC
High Thresh 5 PC
High Thresh 6 PC
High Thresh 7 PC
High Thresh 8 PC
High Thresh 9 PC





















High Thresh 1 PC
High Thresh 2 PC
High Thresh 3 PC
High Thresh 4 PC
High Thresh 5 PC
High Thresh 6 PC
High Thresh 7 PC
High Thresh 8 PC
High Thresh 9 PC
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High Thresh 1 PC
High Thresh 2 PC
High Thresh 3 PC
High Thresh 4 PC
High Thresh 5 PC
High Thresh 6 PC
High Thresh 7 PC
High Thresh 8 PC
High Thresh 9 PC















































































































































































































































































































































































































observe   the   tendency   to   have   a   higher   amount   of 


















































































































































































High Thresh 1 PC
High Thresh 2 PC
High Thresh 3 PC
High Thresh 4 PC
High Thresh 5 PC
High Thresh 6 PC
High Thresh 7 PC
High Thresh 8 PC
High Thresh 9 PC

























































































































































































































































































































































































anomalous   calls   and   global   calls)   of   the   number   of 
detections,   but   in   this   case   (compared   to   the  previous 
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behavior  we   have   analyzed   before:   the   high   thresholds   have   two  maximum  points,   one  with   an 
anomaly's height of 400 calls and another one (lower than the previous one) with 900. A comparison of 
this   behavior  with   the   ones   relative   to   other   anomalous   time­bins   showed   that   this   phenomenon 
happened only for time­bin 252, so that could be related to the fact that this particular time­bin is part 
of an overlapping zone. Further investigations showed that this is the actual reason, since the same 































High Thresh 1 PC
High Thresh 2 PC
High Thresh 3 PC
High Thresh 4 PC
High Thresh 5 PC
High Thresh 6 PC
High Thresh 7 PC
High Thresh 8 PC
High Thresh 9 PC



























































































































































































































each anomalous   time­bin  was  detected   in  a   full  analysis   (100  thresholds  and 10 number  of  PCs), 













We  then   started   to   focus  on   “single   threshold   –   single   number   of  PCs”   analysis,   comparing   the 
software's performances for this type of analysis, for each type of anomalies inserted in the trace.
We started considering the same two parameters we introduced in the previous chapters: the ratio of  




































































































































































The results obtained with multiple­round analysis   led us  to some more observations,  regarding the 
modifications in software's performances when the trace starts to be cleaned up from anomalies. We 
discovered that the number of Principal Components needed to correctly detect and identify behavioral 












of   the  multiple­round   analysis.  We  analyzed   the   software's   performances  using  different   types  of 
anomalies   (single   spike,   rectangular   and   triangular),  with  different   volumes   (different   height,   that 
means number of anomalous calls per time­bin, and different width, that means number of time­bins 
that composed an anomaly).












anomalies   inserted,   and   often  with   low   number   of   Principal   Components.   That   leads   us   to   the 
consideration that  is always better, when using this software for AD applications, using a range of 
thresholds instead than a single value.

























Even   if  we  have   to  pay  attention  on  all   these   issues   this  AD method   is  valuable  because  of  his 
possibility of detecting behavioral anomalies, even if they represent a very small volume of traffic, 
feature that makes this software useful, in particular if used in combination with other kinds of AD 
techniques  (as  we said when we compared the results  with the ones obtained with VoIP Seal).  In 
particular  we   think   that   the  best   solution  would  be  using   first   an  Anomaly  Detector,  with  better 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1000 calls, 10 PC
Ratio bin det.
Ratio URI rec.
Threshold (*10^-6)
